The Political Economy of the Decline in Antitrust Enforcement in the United States
![Thumbnail](/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/528900/CLE_WP_2022_01.pdf.jpg?sequence=5&isAllowed=y)
Open access
Date
2022-01Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics
Abstract
Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. We investigate the political causes of this decline by looking at who made the crucial decisions and the strength of their popular mandate. Using a novel framework to understand the determinants of regulatory capture and several new datasets, we find that there was no public support for the weakening of antitrust enforcement. The decline in antitrust enforcement was the result of a collection of technocratic decisions made in politically unaccountable ways, mostly by regulators and judges. Behind the scenes, big business played a major role in influencing these agents; but other factors (like the increase in private sector pay relative to government pay) and intellectual currents mattered as well. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000528900Publication status
publishedJournal / series
Center for Law & Economics Working Paper SeriesVolume
Publisher
Center for Law & Economics, ETH ZurichSubject
Antitrust; Enforcement; Political Economy; Regulatory CaptureOrganisational unit
03795 - Bechtold, Stefan / Bechtold, Stefan
Related publications and datasets
Is previous version of: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/655709
More
Show all metadata
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics