Open access
Datum
2018-12Typ
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliographie
yes
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Abstract
We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask
problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that
are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about
optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest
in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model
with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment,
policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate
minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and
incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional
on the public good level. Mehr anzeigen
Persistenter Link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000316287Publikationsstatus
publishedZeitschrift / Serie
Economics Working Paper SeriesBand
Verlag
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)Thema
Incentive contracts; Politicians; Multi-task problemsOrganisationseinheit
02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.
ETH Bibliographie
yes
Altmetrics