Open access
Datum
2017Typ
- Conference Paper
ETH Bibliographie
yes
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Abstract
We identify two vulnerabilities for existing highspeed network-layer anonymity protocols, such as LAP and Dovetail. First, the header formats of LAP and Dovetail leak path information, reducing the anonymity-set size when an adversary launches topological attacks. Second, ASes can launch session hijacking attacks to deanonymize destinations. HORNET addresses these problems but incurs additional bandwidth overhead and latency.
In this paper, we propose PHI, a Path-HIdden lightweight anonymity protocol that solves both challenges while maintaining the same level of efficiency as LAP and Dovetail. We present an efficient packet header format that hides path information and a new back-off setup method that is compatible with current and future network architectures. Our experiments demonstrate that PHI expands anonymity sets of LAP and Dovetail by over 30x and reaches 120 Gbps forwarding speed on a commodity software router. Mehr anzeigen
Persistenter Link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000201061Publikationsstatus
publishedExterne Links
Zeitschrift / Serie
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing TechnologiesBand
Seiten / Artikelnummer
Verlag
De GruyterKonferenz
Thema
Anonymity; Path-hidden protocolsOrganisationseinheit
03975 - Perrig, Adrian / Perrig, Adrian
Anmerkungen
Conference lecture on 20 July 2017.ETH Bibliographie
yes
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